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Attention abilities rest on the coordinated interplay of multiple components. One 
consequence to this multifaceted account is that selection processes likely 
intersect with perception at various junctures. Drawing from this overarching view, 
the current research examines how different forms of visuospatial attention 
influence various aspects of conscious perception, including signal detection, 
signal discrimination, visual awareness, and metacognition. In this effort, we 
combined a double spatial cueing approach, where stimulus- and goal-driven 
orienting were concurrently engaged via separate cues, with type 1 and type 2 
signal detection theoretic frameworks through five experiments. Consistent with 
the modular view of visuospatial attention, our comprehensive assessment reveals 
that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting operate independently of each other for 
increasing perceptual sensitivity and reducing the decision bound. Conversely, 
however, our study shows that both forms of orienting hardly influence visual 
awareness and metacognition once perceptual sensitivity is accounted for. Our 
results therefore undermine the idea that attention directly interfaces with 
subjective aspects of perception. Instead, our findings submit a general framework 
whereby these attention modules indirectly impact visual awareness and 
metacognition by increasing perceptual evidence and decreasing the decision 
bound.  
Significance Statement 
While most scientists agree that attention is not a unitary construct, few theories 
consider how different components of attention operate alongside each other to 
shape how we perceive the world. Addressing this shortcoming, the present work 
provides a comprehensive assessment of the combined influence of voluntary and 
involuntary orienting of attention on conscious perception. Our results show that 
both forms of attention operate independently of each other to improve perception 
and mitigate biases during perceptual decision making. In turn, however, we found 
that attention hardly influences subjective aspects of perception like visual 
awareness and metacognition. This outcome challenges the idea that attention 




Attention reflects the ability to select relevant information from our cluttered 2 
environments (Nobre & Kastner, 2014). The need for this selection process arises 3 
from important resources limitations that make it impossible for the brain to fully 4 
process the barrage of sensory events it constantly encounters. Attention therefore 5 
promotes well-adapted behaviors by filtering out irrelevant inputs and boosting 6 
relevant ones (Carrasco, 2011). A key tenet that emerges from the extensive 7 
literature on this cognitive ability is that selection does not correspond to a unitary 8 
process, but instead emerges from the coordinated interplay of multiple functional 9 
systems (Awh et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2013; Chun et al., 2011; Corbetta et al., 10 
2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Knudsen, 2007; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Petersen 11 
& Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Raz & Buhle, 2006; Wright & Ward, 12 
2008). The capacity to select relevant information therefore comprises multiple 13 
components (Fan et al., 2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990; 14 
Raz & Buhle, 2006). This multifaceted view of attention aligns with the emerging 15 
field of connectomics, wherein researchers advocate for the idea that the brain is 16 
fundamentally organized into anatomical and functional subcomponents (Bullmore 17 
& Sporns, 2009; Sporns, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The ability to select sensory inputs 18 
and discard others rests on several such neural systems (Petersen & Posner, 19 
2012). Mounting evidence emphasizes the importance of construing attention in 20 
light of this complexity to better understand how it shapes perception (Carrasco et 21 
al., 2004; Chica & Bartolomeo, 2012; Chica et al., 2016; Chica, Botta, et al., 2012; 22 
Chica et al., 2010; Chica, Paz-Alonso, et al., 2012; Colás et al., 2018; Kusnir et al., 23 
2011). In sum, the notion that attention divides into functional units is  paramount 24 
for elucidating the brain’s capacity to efficiently select relevant information.    25 
 26 
Drawing from this general framework, the present collection of experiments 27 
evaluates this multifaceted account across different aspects of perception, 28 
including signal detection and discrimination, visual awareness, and 29 
metacognition. Our goal is to evaluate how distinct functional systems of 30 
visuospatial attention – namely stimulus- and goal-driven orienting – intersect with 31 
 
 3 
these components of perception. Our study builds from ongoing efforts to uncover 32 
the dynamics that characterizes these different forms of attention (Belopolsky et 33 
al., 2010; Berger et al., 2005; Blair & Ristic, 2018; Chica et al., 2013; Chica, Botta, 34 
et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2006; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Folk & Remington, 1999; 35 
Folk et al., 1992; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Ogawa & 36 
Komatsu, 2004; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012; Ristic & Landry, 2015; Ristic et 37 
al., 2012; Schreij et al., 2008; Theeuwes, 2004, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). 38 
Our approach leverages type 1 and type 2 signal detection theory (SDT) across 39 
target detection and discrimination tasks to provide a comprehensive account of 40 
the influence of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting on conscious perception.    41 
 42 
Stimulus- versus Goal-driven Attention 43 
Researchers often characterize visuospatial attention as a dichotomy, 44 
where stimulus-driven attention corresponds to involuntary orienting responses 45 
following a salient event and goal-driven attention reflects voluntary shifts of 46 
attention resources (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980). In the lab, both forms of 47 
orienting are often operationalized through the spatial cueing paradigm - an 48 
experimental approach based on attentional cues that precede the onset of a target 49 
event and where the features of the cue determines the orienting response (Chica 50 
et al., 2014). Previous work establishes that presenting salient cues at the 51 
periphery of the visual field elicits stimulus-driven attention, even when the cues 52 
are made non-informative about the target’s potential location (Schreij et al., 2008). 53 
Salient events therefore trigger an orienting response despite being task-irrelevant, 54 
a fact which alludes to the automaticity of stimulus-driven attention. In contrast, 55 
informative symbolic cues presented centrally yield goal-driven responses as 56 
participants voluntarily guide their attention based on the information conveyed by 57 
the cue (Olk et al., 2014). This experimental procedure enables researchers to 58 
study each orienting system separately by varying cue features. Critically, this 59 
paradigm operationalizes attention processing by comparing cued and uncued 60 
trials, which highlights the perceptual gain of visuospatial orienting through 61 
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facilitation effects and heightened sensory responses (Jonides, 1981; Luck et al., 62 
2000; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980).  63 
 64 
The characterization of stimulus- and goal-driven attention thrives primarily 65 
on distinct modes of control between involuntary versus voluntary orienting, 66 
respectively. This dichotomy brings about the possibility to frame stimulus- and 67 
goal-driven orienting as separate functional modules of visuospatial attention. The 68 
notion of modularity refers to the emergence of components that exhibit a high 69 
degree of differentiation along various dimensions within complex systems (Barrett 70 
& Kurzban, 2006; Newman, 2006). Consistent with this notion, the modular view 71 
of visuospatial attention draws upon a large body of findings that emphasize pivotal 72 
functional differences between stimulus- and goal-driven orienting (Chica et al., 73 
2013). Modularity therefore supplies researchers with a useful framework to 74 
understand their dynamics, both from a psychological and a neuroscientific 75 
perspective, while keeping in mind that stimulus- and goal-driven attention perform 76 
the same function, namely the selection of relevant information. One important 77 
distinction between them concerns their respective temporal profiles, wherein 78 
stimulus-driven orienting deploys and disengages rapidly, while goal-driven 79 
orienting emerges gradually and exhibit the capacity to stay engaged for an 80 
extended period of time (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). These contrasting temporal 81 
profiles match the quick reflexive responses of stimulus-driven attention on the one 82 
hand, and the slower more deliberate shifts of goal-driven attention on the other 83 
(Egeth & Yantis, 1997). Another important difference pertains to the interference 84 
of secondary information processing on goal-driven attention (Jonides, 1981) – a 85 
feature that reflects resource limitation during the voluntary control of attention 86 
(Buschman & Kastner, 2015; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014; Knudsen, 2007; 87 
Noudoost et al., 2010). Critically, a different kind of resource limitation has been 88 
found to impair stimulus-driven attention (Lavie et al., 2004). Likewise, some 89 
findings show a double dissociation between the effects of stimulus- and goal-90 
driven cueing, which serves to further underline the divide between them (Funes 91 
et al., 2007). Altogether, a large body of research supports the idea that both forms 92 
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of orienting correspond to distinct functional modules that operate through 93 
separate means (for a review, see Chica et al., 2013).  94 
 95 
Questions that follow from this dichotomy concern the levels of 96 
independence, cooperation, and interference between these orienting modules. 97 
Despite compelling evidence about their functional differences, some findings 98 
highlight circumstances where the modularity of visuospatial attention breaks down 99 
(Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Hopfinger & West, 2006; Ruz & Lupiáñez, 2002). Along 100 
those lines, the contingent capture hypothesis posits that stimulus-driven attention 101 
rests on top-down processes and that task sets determine the emergence of the 102 
reflexive orienting response (Folk & Remington, 1999; Folk et al., 1992). 103 
Proponents of this viewpoint accordingly argue that salient events only elicit 104 
stimulus-driven responses when they harmonize with the overarching goals and 105 
intentions of individuals. In other words, mental processes typically linked to goal-106 
driven orienting are made critical for the emergence of stimulus-driven orienting. 107 
In the same vein, some reports indicate that factors pertaining to goal-driven 108 
orienting modulate the capture of stimulus-driven attention via salient events 109 
(Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Note that other 110 
work submits opposing results and instead argues that stimulus-driven orienting 111 
rests solely on the automatic capture of attention resources (Theeuwes, 1992, 112 
2004). Beyond these ongoing debates about the role of top-down factors in 113 
stimulus-driven orienting, the literature highlights instances where these different 114 
forms of attention orienting interact with one another, along their temporal 115 
dynamics (Grubb et al., 2015; Hopfinger & West, 2006) or in context of greater task 116 
difficulty (Berger et al., 2005). These findings demonstrate that certain 117 
experimental contexts can weaken the functional modularity of visuospatial 118 
orienting, which raises important questions about their dynamics.               119 
 120 
The double cueing experimental approach tackles this line of inquiry by 121 
engaging both attention systems concurrently - each via a different cue (Berger et 122 
al., 2005). In this way, a peripheral abrupt onset engages stimulus-driven orienting, 123 
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while a concomitant central symbolic cue prompts goal-driven orienting (see Figure 124 
1). Relying on different cues allows for comparisons of isolated and joint effects of 125 
these orienting systems, and ultimately assess their interaction. The current study 126 
rests on this experimental strategy to investigate the dynamics of stimulus- and 127 
goal-driven attention across different facets of conscious perception. Our approach 128 
further rests on type 1 and type 2 SDT to ascertain these patterns. This analytical 129 
framework proceeds from two sorts of measure (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Macmillan 130 
& Creelman, 2005; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, 2014): (1) An objective response, 131 
coined type 1 response, to assess task performance during detection, 132 
discrimination or identification of a target stimulus; and (2) subjective judgments of 133 
perception, labelled type 2 response, where participants report certain aspects of 134 
their phenomenology with respect to perception based on their introspection 135 
(Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). SDT represents a formidable tool for 136 
examining type 1 and type 2 responses because it allows for the estimation of 137 
perceptual and introspective sensitivity (i.e., the relationship of signal to noise) 138 
independently from response biases (i.e., liberal or conservative stance with 139 
respect to the amount of evidence that underlie responses tendencies). In this 140 
fashion, while d’ estimates perceptual sensitivity, meta-d’ corresponds to 141 
introspective sensitivity in terms of type 1 sensitivity parameter that would lead to 142 
the observed type 2 responses assuming that the observer uses the same 143 
information for producing type 1 and type 2 responses. In other words, meta-d’ 144 
reflects the degree to which subjective judgments predict task performance 145 
independently from biases. Previous work highlights the reliability of this approach 146 
for accurately gauging introspective access to internal information by comparing 147 
meta-d’ to d’ since both estimates rest on the same scale; this comparison 148 
produces an index called M-Ratio (Barrett et al., 2013). Thus, when the meta-d’ 149 
over d ratio (i.e., M-Ratio) equals 1, the model indicates that individuals make 150 
optimal use of perceptual sensitivity (i.e., d’) to make subjective judgments. This 151 
approach also provides an estimation of response bias and subjective uncertainty 152 
based on type 1 and type 2 criteria, respectively. Hence, researchers can 153 
determine whether performance and subjective judgments result from changes in 154 
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sensitivity or some form response bias. d’ and meta-d’ typically correlate positively, 155 
which implies that perceptual evidence impacts introspective sensitivity in a 156 
manner that allows individuals to make use of the information available to form 157 
their subjective judgments (e.g., Kepecs et al., 2008). However, despite the strong 158 
bond between perceptual and introspective sensitivities, previous work highlights 159 
experimental conditions where we can observe a dissociation between them  (e.g., 160 
Lau & Passingham, 2006; however, see Peters & Lau, 2015). This dissociation 161 
suggests that type 1 and type 2 responses follow from distinct processes, rather 162 
than a single channel (Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Rausch et al., 2018; Rausch & 163 
Zehetleitner, 2017). The present study proceeds from this framework to examine 164 
whether stimulus- and goal-driven orienting modulates these different components 165 
of perception and tests whether we can observe a similar dissociation as a function 166 
of visuospatial attention. Furthermore, our experiment will determine whether both 167 
forms of orienting operate independently or interactively at these levels of 168 
perceptual processing. Our experimental approach additionally uses a masking 169 
procedure so as to avoid floor and ceiling effects (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006).  170 
 171 
Our study addresses ongoing disputes regarding the role of attention in 172 
consciousness (Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015). Based on the SDT framework, a 173 
large body of research confirms the impacts on stimulus- and goal-driven attention 174 
on perceptual evidence and the decision bound (Carrasco, 2011; Hawkins et al., 175 
1990; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Rahnev et al., 2011). In turn, however, there is some 176 
contention in the field as to whether attention directly influences the subjective level 177 
of perception. Given the strong link between perceptual and introspective 178 
sensitivities, the influence of attention on the former likely impacts the latter. Still, 179 
the current study aims to determine whether attention enhances the subjective 180 
component of perception beyond that of task performance. Type 2 SDT is designed 181 
to tackle this inquiry, whereby the observation that stimulus- and goal-driven 182 
attention increases M-Ratio would imply that these forms of orienting directly 183 




The idea that attention is a prerequisite to conscious perception is quite 186 
prevalent (Cohen et al., 2012; De Brigard & Prinz, 2010; Dehaene et al., 2006; 187 
O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Posner, 1994, 2012). This view mainly follows from 188 
evidence showing that individuals typically remain unaware of unattended events 189 
(Jensen et al., 2011; Mack, 2003; Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, 2010, 2013; Most et 190 
al., 2005; Most et al., 2000; Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro et al., 1997; Simons, 191 
2000; Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons & Levin, 1997). In contrast, certain findings 192 
intimate that attention and awareness reflect orthogonal processes (Brascamp et 193 
al., 2010; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel, 2017; van Boxtel et al., 2010a; van 194 
Boxtel et al., 2010b; Watanabe et al., 2011; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-195 
Baudry, 2008). Thus far, evidence from the spatial cueing procedure remains 196 
agnostic relative to these ongoing disputes. While some studies argue favorably 197 
for the primacy of goal-driven orienting (Kurtz et al., 2017; Vernet et al., 2019; 198 
Zizlsperger et al., 2012), others instead promote the centrality of stimulus-driven 199 
orienting (Chica, Botta, et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2011; Chica et al., 2010), or even 200 
favor both forms of orienting (Hsu et al., 2011). Conversely, some studies report 201 
that attention hardly influence subjective reports of perception beyond task 202 
performance and therefore undermine the attention view of consciousness 203 
(Wilimzig et al., 2008; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008). 204 
Methodological and analytical differences likely account for this heterogeneous 205 
landscape. In particular, few assays control for potential biases that might plague 206 
type 2 responses. Thus, variations in subjective reports following visuospatial 207 
attention could in fact result from variations of the decision bound (Peters et al., 208 
2016). Previous work strongly alludes to this possibility (Rahnev et al., 2011). The 209 
present work proceeds from these disputes and aims to overcome ambivalence 210 
regarding the influence of stimulus- and goal-driven attention employing the double 211 
cueing approach to tease apart the respective influence of each orienting form, 212 
while also addressing caveats relative to response biases using type 2 SDT.   213 
      214 
Experimental Predictions 215 
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Our overarching goal is to evaluate the modularity of stimulus- and goal-216 
driven orienting across objective and subjective dimensions of perception. In this 217 
way, a statistically reliable interaction between both forms of orienting would 218 
specify that the combined synergy between them differs from the sum of their 219 
isolated effects - a pattern that would reflect a breakdown of modularity. 220 
Conversely, the absence of an interaction would support the modular view of 221 
visuospatial attention by promoting that the combined effect of stimulus- and goal-222 
driven attention likely corresponds to the sum of their isolated effect. Note that 223 
these interpretations assume that main effects for each form of orienting are 224 
statistically reliable.  225 
 226 
Experiment 1 and 2 227 
Methods   228 
Participants. We recruited 28 and 37 participants for our first and second 229 
experiment, respectively. Each participant reported normal or corrected-to-normal 230 
vision. They received monetary compensation of $10/hour CAD for two two-hour 231 
sessions of 1536 trials each. Participants completed both sessions on different 232 
days. Each session comprised 8 blocks of 192 trials. Before each session, 233 
participants completed a series of 10 practice trials until they confirmed 234 
understanding the task. All procedures were approved by the local ethics review 235 
board.  236 
 237 
We reasoned that sample size estimations should be considered in light of 238 
the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention on perceptual sensitivity. Thus, in 239 
order to properly examine our hypotheses, we determined that the sample should 240 
allow for perceptual facilitation to occur following both stimulus- and goal-driven 241 
spatial cueing. However, in the near absence of specific information regarding the 242 
effect size estimates for our methodology, we considered experiment 1 to be 243 
exploratory and based our sample size on previous experiments (see the following 244 
report for effect size estimations; Chica et al., 2014). Here, we conducted apriori 245 
power analyses for repeated measures F-tests on cueing effects for response 246 
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times in the context of target discrimination tasks using G*Power3 (Faul et al., 247 
2007). Our goal was to determine the sample size for facilitation effects of stimulus- 248 
and goal-driven orienting. At long cue-target latencies (i.e., > 500ms), a central 249 
predictive cue merely requires 6 participants to achieve a power of .8 following the 250 
large effect size observed in previous work (η2 = .34) and an alpha of .05. Likewise, 251 
at short cue-target latencies (i.e., < 300ms), a peripheral non-predictive cue only 252 
requires 3 participants to achieve a power of .8 following a large effect size (η2 = 253 
.84). Based on this information, and again to ensure proper evaluation of our 254 
hypotheses, our recruitment for experiment 1 was four folds greater than our 255 
estimations of goal-driven orienting and nine times greater than that of stimulus-256 
driven orienting (Chica et al., 2014).  257 
 258 
We determined the sample size for experiment 2 from the results of 259 
experiment 1 using hierarchical linear regression modelling through the lme4 260 
package (Bates et al., 2015) and simulations from the SIMR package (Green & 261 
MacLeod, 2016) in R Studio (RStudio-Team, 2020). Consistent with our previous 262 
assessment, simulations revealed that 6 participants were required to achieve a 263 
power of .8 relative to the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention on 264 
discrimination performance when alpha was set to .05. In this regard, we observed 265 
somewhat of a large effect size when fitting both effects, Marginal R2GLMM = .23.  266 
(Barton & Barton, 2019; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Having confirmed that the 267 
sample size was reliable for detecting the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven 268 
orienting, we opted for a sample size that would match that of experiment 1. Lastly, 269 
we maximized power to better assess our hypotheses by pooling data from both 270 
experiment 1 and 2. Note that our findings nevertheless replicated separately 271 
across both experiments (see supplementary material).    272 
 273 
Three participants were excluded in each experiment due to self-attrition. 274 
We additionally excluded five participants from experiment 1 and ten from 275 
experiment 2 based on the following criteria: Elevated (> 15%) rates of either 276 
anticipation errors (Response Time < 150ms), timeout errors (Response Time > 277 
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1500ms), or wrong key pressed, as well as below chance performance (< 50% 278 
accuracy), or implausible subjective report (e.g., 100% seen target). Specifically, 279 
four exclusions followed from elevated anticipation errors and one due to 280 
implausible number of seen target events in experiment 1. In turn, all ten excluded 281 
participants from experiment 2 showed elevated anticipation errors. Three of those 282 
individuals already excluded due to anticipation errors also showed elevated 283 
numbers of wrong key presses and poor discrimination accuracy. 20 participants 284 
(15 adult females; age: M = 21 y.o., SD = 1.23) were kept for experiment 1 and 24 285 
(15 adult females; age: M = 20.54 y.o., SD = 2.36) for experiment 2. We deemed 286 
it important to remove time out errors because these responses potentially involve 287 
additional perceptual processing that may hurt the generalizability of our findings. 288 
The elevated number of exclusions we report here pose a threat to future 289 
replications. In this regard, a few participants reported that the task was particularly 290 
tedious, which could explain the pattern we observed with respect to exclusion.  291 
 292 
Apparatus and Stimuli. All participants viewed the task on a 17.5-in CRT monitor 293 
(ViewSonic Graphics Series G90fB) sitting approximately 60 cm away. We used 294 
Psychtoolbox-3 and MATLAB (Mathworks inc. version R2015a) to display the 295 
stimuli. The screen was set to 85hz. All stimuli were made from black lines (i.e., 296 
RGB values of 0, 0, 0; 1.0 cd/m2) against a grey background (i.e., RGB values of 297 
128, 128, 128; 21.8 cd/m2) except for the target gratings. The targets were circular 298 
gratings (i.e., 3° of visual angle) of alternating parallel lines (3 cpd) of black (RGB 299 
values of 0, 0, 0) and white (RGB values of 255, 255, 255; 158.3 cd/m2) with a 300 
oriented clockwise or counter-clockwise, wherein the orientation of the targets 301 
ranged from 15° to 30° in steps of 5° degrees. However, the current analyses did 302 
not include this factor. All four target locations were marked by boxes subtending 303 
3° of visual angles, each situated 3° of visual angle away from fixation at one of 304 
the four cardinal points. Arabic numbers “1”, “3”, “6” and “9” (i.e., 2° by 1.5° of visual 305 
angles) served as cues for goal driven attention. Note that symbolic number cues 306 
do not elicit a pure form of goal-driven orienting. This limitation follows from prior 307 
knowledge of numerical concepts and their relation to spatial representations 308 
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where numbers can prompt  automatic orienting responses consistent with the 309 
number line or the spatial location of numbers within clocks (e.g., the number 6 310 
situated at the bottom of the clock; Ristic et al., 2006). It seems reasonable to 311 
assume that such numerical prior knowledge contributed to the orienting response 312 
here. We nevertheless opted for this option to engage goal-driven attention given 313 
the difficulty of the task, as the number cues were easier to process with respect 314 
to four target locations. Conversely, we cued stimulus-driven attention by briefly 315 
changing the line drawing from one of the placeholders to white. The backwards 316 
mask consisted of checkerboard patterns comprising 10 by 10 white and black 317 
squares, each mask subtended 2° visual angle. 318 
 319 
Design. Participants viewed both cues on each trial, which entails that goal-driven 320 
and stimulus-driven attention systems were engaged throughout the experiment. 321 
Consistent with previous studies relying on a double cueing approach (see Figure 322 
1), we presented goal-driven and stimulus-driven cues at different latencies, 323 
wherein the target would onset within a time-window corresponding to the maximal 324 
efficiency of each system (Chica et al., 2014). Number cues were predictive of the 325 
target’s location, whereby the number “1” indicated that the target was 62.5% likely 326 
to onset at the top location, the number “3” indicated that the target was 62.5% 327 
likely to onset rightward, the number “6” indicated that the target was 62.5% likely 328 
to onset to the bottom location, the number “9” indicated that the target was 62.5% 329 
likely to onset leftward. The number cues were therefore task-relevant. To ensure 330 
that this peripheral cue solely engaged stimulus-driven attention, the cue-target 331 
spatial contingency was set to 25%, such that the cue was not predictive of the 332 
target’s location. The experimenter informed participants about cue-target 333 
contingencies. Hence, participants were asked to guide their attention according 334 
to the number cue, while discounting the peripheral cueing event.  335 
 336 
Critically, given cueing contingencies, sometimes both cues would indicate 337 
different target locations, other times the same location. Thus, the mixture of 338 
cueing conditions and target locations produces a two-by-two factorial albeit 339 
 
 13 
imbalanced design, comprising stimulus-driven (i.e., valid versus invalid) and goal-340 
driven attention (i.e., valid versus invalid; see Figure 1). For both sessions, this 341 
task comprised 864 trials where both cues were invalid, 288 trials where the 342 
stimulus-driven cue was valid and the goal-driven cue was invalid, 1440 trials 343 
where the stimulus-driven cue was invalid and the goal-driven cue was valid, and 344 
480 trials where both cues were valid. Our approach also relied on two distinct 345 
target-mask latencies to explore cueing effects across varying levels of signal 346 
strengths. Cueing conditions and masking latency were mixed within blocks. Cue 347 
direction and target position were equally spread across all four locations. For each 348 
trial, participants were required to input a type 1 discrimination responses by 349 
pressing the “F” key with their left index finger or “J” key with right index finger to 350 
subsequently indicate the orientation of the target. Thereafter, participants also 351 
specified a type 2 subjective report regarding target events pressing the “F” key 352 
with their left index finger or “J” key with right index finger. While type 1 responses 353 
were identical for both experiments, type 2 responses were different. For 354 
experiment 1, participants indicated whether they consciously saw the target event 355 
or not. Specifically, participants were explicitly instructed to indicate whether they 356 
had a conscious experience of seeing the target event or not. For experiment 2, 357 
they indicated whether they were confident about the response they just provided. 358 
Input keys for “Seen” and “Unseen” options, as well as “Confident” and “Not 359 
Confident”, were counterbalanced across participants.   360 
 361 
Procedure. Every trial began with a fixation cross for 495ms, followed by the onset 362 
of a goal-driven cue at the center with its latency randomly jittered between 396 363 
and 495ms. The stimulus-driven cue would then onset and remained on the screen 364 
for 99ms. The target appeared after a random variable delay from 0ms to 198ms. 365 
We used a uniform distribution for random latencies. Therefore, the goal-driven 366 
cue-target onset asynchrony varied between 495ms and 792ms, while the 367 
stimulus-driven cue-target onset asynchrony varied between 99ms and 297ms. 368 
The target would onset in one of the four target locations and was then 369 
subsequently masked. Target-mask onset asynchrony were 22ms and 55ms. The 370 
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goal-driven cue and mask remained on the screen for 1991ms or until the 371 
participant inputted their discrimination responses relative to the target orientation. 372 
Next, a screen prompted participants to provide their subjective responses. The 373 
words “Seen” and “Unseen” for experiment 1, or “Confident” and “Not Confident” 374 
for experiment 2, appeared for 2970ms or until the participant responded a second 375 
time. The location of each word mapped onto the keys for the type 2 responses, 376 
wherein leftward location corresponded to the “F” key and the rightward location 377 
the “J” key.  Participants were asked to fixate at the center of the screen throughout 378 
the experiment and input both type 1 and type 2 responses as quickly and 379 







Figure 1. Experimental design. We used a two-by-two double cueing experimental approach across all five 
experiments, involving stimulus-driven attention cueing (valid vs. invalid) by goal-driven attention cueing (valid 
vs. invalid). A stimulus-driven and a goal-driven cue preceded the target event, while checkerboard pattern 
masked all four target locations thereafter following 22ms or 55ms. See methods for detail. A. In Experiments 
1 & 2, we instructed participants to discriminate the orientation of the grating target (i.e., clockwise vs. 
counterclockwise). Next, we asked them to report visual awareness of the target event in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
seen vs. unseen), and confidence judgments about task performance in Experiment 2 (i.e., confident vs. not 
confident). B. In Experiment 3, we again instructed participants to discriminate the orientation of the grating 
target (i.e., clockwise vs. counterclockwise) and then provide confidence judgments about task performance. 
Masking latency was fixed at 55ms. Note that we titrated the contrast value of the Gabor stimuli across 
attention conditions following the QUEST algorithm. The purpose was to equate performance across attention 
conditions, and then evaluate the direct influence of attention on confidence judgments following stimulus- and 
goal-driven cueing C. In experiment 4 and 5, we combined the double cueing experimental approach with a 
detection task, where the target event occurred for only half of the trials. The masking latency was set to 55ms 
in Experiment 4, and then 22ms and 55ms in Experiment 5. We instructed participants to indicate whether a 
target event had occurred (i.e., present vs. absent) at the probed location, wherein one of the masks turned 
red to probe a specific location.  
 
Analysis. We pooled type 1 responses from experiment 1 and experiment 2 381 
together. Likewise, for type 2 responses. We opted for this approach because 382 
results from each experiment separately were identical (see supplementary 383 
material).    384 
 385 
Discrimination Responses – Type 1 Responses - Signal Detection Theory. We 386 
used signal detection theory to assess discrimination performance (Macmillan & 387 
Creelman, 2005). For type 1 responses, estimations of perceptual sensitivity d’ and 388 
decision criterion C is computed through a direct analytic solution:  389 
 390 
d’ = z(hit rate) – z(false alarm) 391 
C = -0.5 *(z(hit rate) + z(false alarm)) 392 
 393 
where z represents the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution. Note that in 394 
simple target discrimination tasks the hit rate is defined as the correct response 395 
when the corresponding stimulus is displayed on screen (e.g., responding 396 
clockwise to clockwise stimulus), while false alarm rates is defined as the incorrect 397 
response when the other stimulus is displayed (e.g., responding clockwise to 398 
counterclockwise stimulus; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). We applied the 399 
following correction ((2*N)-1)/(2*N), where N equals the number of trials, whenever 400 
hit rate was equal to 1; and 1/(2*N) whenever false alarm was equal to 0 401 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Three percent of cells required such corrections. 402 
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Inferential statistics were done through hierarchical regression modelling (Gelman 403 
& Hill, 2006), as implemented by the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R Studio 404 
(RStudio-Team, 2016). Goodness-of-fit was determined in a stepwise fashion 405 
using chi-square tests. We also informed model selection using Bayesian 406 
information criterion (BIC). We estimated the effect size for the best fitting model 407 
by calculating the marginal R2 using the MuMln R package (Barton & Barton, 2019; 408 
Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013) We additionally evaluated the reliability of the null 409 
hypothesis for the absence of an interaction between stimulus-driven and goal-410 
driven cue validity by estimating Bayes factor (i.e., Pr(data|H0/Pr(data|H1)) using 411 
the BIC (Wagenmakers, 2007) following the following equation: 412 
 413 
BF01 = eΔBIC10/2 414 
 415 
Subjective Judgements – Type 2 Responses – HMeta-d. We similarly relied on the 416 
signal detection theoretic framework to assess type 2 responses in order to 417 
estimate efficacy for subjective reports across attention conditions (Maniscalco & 418 
Lau, 2012, 2014). However, contrary to type 1 SDT, the estimation of parameters 419 
for type 2 SDT does not follow from a straightforward solution and instead requires 420 
for researchers to fit estimates over the probability of being confident given a 421 
stimuli events and discrimination responses. Here, we used HMeta-d, a MATLAB 422 
toolbox (Mathworks inc. version R2017a; note that the toolbox is also available in 423 
R) designed to estimate type 2 SDT parameters at the group-level, while taking 424 
into account subject-level uncertainty, through the exploration of parameters 425 
spaces via Bayesian statistics and Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) sampling 426 
strategy as implemented in JAGS (Plummer), as well as given the specifications 427 
of the model and the data (Fleming, 2017; https://github.com/metacoglab/HMeta-428 
d). This analytic approach provides statistical inference through Bayesian 429 
computations of posterior densities that estimate parameters values for type 2 430 
SDT, including type 2 responses efficiency, herein the log of M-Ratio (i.e., log 431 
(meta-d’/d’)). Furthermore, we extended this analytic strategy to estimate 432 
parameter values of linear regression models for examining how stimulus-driven 433 
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attention, goal-driven attention, and their interaction predict log M-Ratio. We 434 
included these beta parameters in a stepwise fashion through different models. 435 
Note, however, that we performed this analysis separately for early (i.e., 22ms) 436 
and late (i.e., 55ms) masking latency to avoid appending additional parameters 437 
and hurting the interpretation due to the complexity of the models. This approach 438 
was consistent with hypothesis for type 2 SDT and the influence of attention on 439 
conscious perception. Although we compared the different models based on 440 
deviance information criterion (DIC), we nevertheless examined the full models 441 
across both masking latencies: 442 
 443 
Log M-Ratio ~ β0 + β1[Stimulus-Driven cue validity] + β2[Goal-Driven cue validity] 444 
+ β3[Stimulus-driven cue validity X Goal-driven cue validity] 445 
 446 
Parameter estimation relied on 3 MCMC chains of 100,000 samples with burn-in 447 
of 1000 samples and thinning of 10 samples, while using the standard prior values 448 
from the toolbox. We evaluated convergence of the model by inspecting MCMC 449 
chains and by ensuring that the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic metrics (R-hat) were 450 
below 1.1 for all parameter estimations (Gelman & Rubin, 1992). We used the 95% 451 
high-density interval (HDI) from the posterior samples to assess the parameter 452 
estimates (Kruschke, 2015). We used the same approach to evaluate how 453 
stimulus- and goal-driven orienting operate at the level of the Type 2 criteria (see 454 
supplementary material).     455 
 456 
Results  457 
Objective performance (type 1 response) in experiment 1 and 2. Following the 458 
target discrimination task, we computed SDT estimates for each participant across 459 
the masking and attention conditions, and then relied on hierarchical linear 460 
regression modelling to evaluate the influence of each experimental variable. Our 461 
step-wise approach to determine the best fitting model first included masking 462 
latency (i.e., early and late), then stimulus-driven attention (i.e., valid and invalid), 463 
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followed by goal-driven attention (i.e., valid and invalid), as well as their interactions 464 
as fixed factors, with subjects as random factors.  465 
 466 
Our results are consistent with the modular view of visuospatial attention 467 
where both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting influenced perceptual sensitivity 468 
across both masking latencies yet did not interact (Figure 2). According to our 469 
stepwise approach, the best fitting model (see Tables 1 and 2 in supplementary 470 
material; Marginal R2GLMM = .46) conveys that masking latency (β = 0.82, SE = 471 
0.11, 95% CI [0.61, 1.04]), stimulus-driven cue validity (β = 0.55, SE = 0.09, 95% 472 
CI [0.38, 0.73]), goal-driven cue validity (β = 0.96, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.78, 1.13]), 473 
and masking latency by goal-driven cue validity interaction (β = 0.31, SE = 0.13, 474 
95% CI [0.06, 0.56]) represent reliable predictors. Thus, all three variables 475 
improved discrimination performance, while the benefits of goal-driven increases 476 
slightly for the longer masking latency. Critically, the full model comprising the 477 
interactions between stimulus-driven cue validity and goal-driven cue validity, as 478 
well as the three-way interaction between masking latency, stimulus-driven cue 479 
validity, and goal-driven cue validity, failed to improve the fit of the data (χ2 (2) = 480 
1.67, p = 0.434). Here, the stimulus-driven cue validity by goal-driven cue validity 481 
two-way interaction (β = -0.12, SE = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.23]) and the masking 482 
latency by stimulus-driven cue validity by goal-driven cue validity three-way 483 
interaction (β = -0.07, SE = 0.25, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.42]) both proved statistically 484 
unreliable predictors (see Figure 2). Evidence therefore indicates that stimulus- 485 
and goal-driven orienting operate separately in boosting the perceptual signal. We 486 
further evaluated this hypothesis by assessing evidence favoring the null 487 
hypothesis (i.e., the best fitting model) versus the alternative hypothesis (i.e., the 488 
best fitting model with the stimulus-driven by goal-driven two-way interaction, and 489 
again with the three-way masking latency by stimulus-driven by goal-driven 490 
interaction) using Bayes factors. This analytical strategy weights both hypotheses 491 
against the data and provides additional information for interpreting null findings 492 
(Aczel et al., 2018). Our results favored the null hypothesis in both cases, wherein 493 
the analyses returned BF01 = 8.5 when we included the stimulus-driven by goal-494 
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driven two-way interaction in the alternative model, and BF01 = 10.23 when we 495 
included the masking latency by stimulus-driven by goal-driven three-way 496 
interaction in the alternative model. Note that we corroborated these results for 497 
experiment 1 and 2 separately (see Tables 3 and 4 in supplementary material).    498 
We similarly assessed the decision criterion parameter of the SDT model. The best 499 
model solely involved masking latency as a predictor (see Tables 5 and 6 in 500 
supplementary material; β = -0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.11, -0.004]; Marginal 501 
R2GLMM = .003).  502 
 
Figure 2. Type 1 signal detection analysis for the discrimination response in Experiment 1 and 2. A. 
Averaged perceptual sensitivity estimates (d’) across stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and 
55ms masking latencies. B. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models to predict perceptual sensitivity 
(d’) and therefore evaluate the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention, as well as masking latencies. 
Here, we plot fixed effects β parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI.    
 
Note that we also evaluated median correct response times and found no evidence 503 
of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (see Supplementary Figure 1; Tables 7 and 8 in 504 
supplementary material). 505 
  506 
Subjective judgments (type 2 responses) for experiment 1 and 2. The assessment 507 
of M-Ratio through hierarchical Bayesian modelling revealed the limited influence 508 
of attention processing on subjective judgments of perception. Visual assessment 509 
of the MCMC samples and Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (i.e., R-Hat < 1.1) confirmed 510 
convergence of the models (see supplementary Figure 3). The DIC varied 511 
marginally across models for both early and late masking latencies (Figure 3), 512 
which entails that more complex models failed to improve the fit compared to the 513 
baseline model (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). Here, we observe that the 95% HDI of 514 
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the posterior densities for the beta estimates in the full models encompassed zero 515 
across early and late masking latencies (Figure 3). For early mask latency, the 516 
intercept of the model conveyed that the M-Ratio approximated 1 for the 517 
unattended condition as (μ of β0 = 1.14, 95% HDI [.94 1.36]), which indicates that 518 
participant based their subjective judgments on the perceptual information 519 
available regardless of attention processing. Note that, since our attention 520 
variables were dummy coded, the intercept estimates the M-Ratio at baseline (i.e., 521 
the unattended condition). Importantly, both stimulus-driven and goal-driven 522 
attention failed to improve M-Ratio (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity] = -.002, 523 
95% HDI [-.263 .261]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.014, 95% HDI [-.225 524 
.196]), while their interaction was also statistically unreliable (μ of β3[Stimulus-525 
Driven Cue Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.0195, 95% HDI [-.341 .281]). 526 
We observed a similar pattern for the late masking latency, although participants 527 
showed a marginal benefit of the M-Ratio at baseline (μ of β0 = 1.21, 95% HDI 528 
[1.08 1.34]). Again, however, we observed that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting 529 
failed to improved type 2 response sensitivity (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity] 530 
= .011, 95% HDI [-.145 .167]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .096, 95% HDI [-531 
.035 .228]); and likewise for the interaction parameter (μ of β3[Stimulus-Driven Cue 532 
Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.014, 95% HDI [-.211 .179]). Plotting the 533 
corresponding estimated averaged M-Ratio per conditions across each participant 534 
corroborated our assessment and revealed little variations across attention 535 
conditions (see Figure 3). Note that we observe the same results for experiment 1 536 
and experiment 2 separately (see supplementary Figures 4 and 5). Altogether, our 537 
type 1 and type 2 SDT analyses demonstrate how visuospatial orienting of 538 
attention fails to increase introspective sensitivity beyond that of perceptual 539 
sensitivity, which implies that attention influences the subjective components of 540 
perception through lower level processing. This outcome entails that the locus of 541 
stimulus- and goal-driven orienting therefore appears limited to the perceptual level 542 
of processing and that both forms of orienting indirectly interface with the subjective 543 
level of perception. Note that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting, as well as their 544 
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interaction, were also statistically unreliable for the type 2 criteria (see 545 
supplementary Figures 6 and 7). 546 
  
 
Figure 3. Type 2 signal detection analysis for subjective judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2. A. Averaged values for estimated individual values for type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) from 
MCMC modelling across stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and 55ms mask latencies. Error bars 
represent bootstrapped 95% C.I. B. Deviance information criterion that corresponds to the four linear 
regression models that were fitted to the data to estimate M-Ratio from Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of 
stimulus- and goal-driven orienting. We fitted models separately for 22ms and 55ms masking latencies. C. 
Posterior densities for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2 responses 
efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) at 22ms masking latency. The dotted lines represent 95% HDI. D. Posterior densities 
for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., M-
Ratio) at 55ms masking latency. The dotted lines represent 95% HDI. 
 
The results from experiments 1 and 2 inform the current research in two 547 
ways. First, our findings support the modular of visuospatial orienting by showing 548 
that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting enhance perceptual sensitivity with limited 549 
interaction. Both forms of orienting therefore parallel each other at this level of 550 
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processing. Second, evidence did not support the idea that attention directly 551 
interfaces with the subjective components of perception. However, both of these 552 
interpretations rest on null hypotheses, which could raise concerns regarding type 553 
2 error. Our approach has already addressed such worries here. In particular, we 554 
observed that evidence supports our null hypotheses despite the reliable effects of 555 
stimulus- and goal-driven attention on perceptual processing. Therefore, following 556 
a-priori power analyses, the absence of evidence needs to be explained while both 557 
forms of orienting clearly benefited perception. Furthermore, we should also 558 
consider that we replicated these null results in each experiment individually (see 559 
Supplementary Material). In other words, we combined data from both installments 560 
to maximize power, but nevertheless observed the same pattern in experiment 1 561 
and 2. Lastly, we evaluated whether evidence supports these null hypotheses  562 
using Bayes statistics instead of solely relying on null hypothesis testing (Dienes, 563 
2014; Gallistel, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). Here, lack of power would convey 564 
some form of ambiguity. And yet, evidence clearly favored null hypotheses. 565 
Altogether, our approach provides a solid basis for arguing in favor of null 566 
hypotheses.  567 
 568 
As mentioned in the introduction, one caveat that often besets the field of 569 
consciousness studies pertains to the impact of task performance on subjective 570 
reports (Irvine, 2013). The main issue is that, despite their strong bond, subjective 571 
components of perception are distinct from task performance (Lau & Passingham, 572 
2006; Weiskrantz, 1986), which emphasizes the need to delineate both processes 573 
to precisely gauge changes in conscious perception independently from those of 574 
task performance. The relative blindsight approach represents an experimental 575 
strategy designed to remove the influence of performance on subjective judgments 576 
across variables of interests (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Samaha, 2015). This 577 
outcome is achieved by matching performances across conditions via a titration 578 
procedure so that type 2 responses may vary while performance remains constant. 579 
Hence, in contrast to type 2 SDT where variations of subjective judgements and 580 
introspective sensitivity are isolated through analytical means, relative blindsight 581 
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achieves the same goal via experimental means. We adopted this methodology in 582 
our third experiment to corroborate our previous results, and thereby validate our 583 
findings beyond type 2 SDT. Our goal was to replicate our findings about how 584 
attention relates the subjective components of perception using the relative 585 
blindsight approach and therefore corroborate our current interpretation.       586 
 587 
Experiment 3 588 
Method 589 
Participants. We recruited 33 participants for the third experiment. They received 590 
a monetary compensation of $10/hour CAD for two sessions of 1728 trials. 591 
Participants completed both sessions on different days. Each session comprised 592 
12 blocks of 144 trials. Participants completed a series of 10 practice trials until 593 
they understood the task. Given that our objective was to replicate outcomes from 594 
experiments 1 and 2, we aimed for a similar sample size.  595 
 596 
Five participants were excluded due to elevated (> 15%) anticipation errors 597 
(Response Time < 150ms). 28 participants (17 adult females; age: M = 22.44 y.o, 598 
SD = 3.6) were included in this experiment. 599 
 600 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were similar to the first two 601 
experiments, with the following exceptions (see Figure 1). All four target-602 
placeholders, as well as the masking stimulus, were changed from squares to 603 
circles. We also switched the target stimulus from a circular grating to a Gabor 604 
patch (i.e., a sinusoidal pattern combined with a Gaussian envelope) subtending 605 
3° of visual angle, 3 cpd; while orientation was fixed to 15° or -15°. Moreover, the 606 
purpose of this third experiment was to directly evaluate the effects of stimulus-607 
driven and goal-driven attention on subjective reports using the relative blindsight 608 
approach where we control for task performance. We relied on the QUEST 609 
algorithm to achieve this experimental strategy (Watson & Pelli, 1983), wherein the 610 
Michelson contrast value of the Gabor target would vary as a function of attention 611 
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conditions. Thus, we equalized type 1 response performance across the 612 
unattended, stimulus-driven, goal-driven, and combined attention conditions.  613 
 614 
Design & Procedure. The design and procedure were similar to previous 615 
experiments, with the following exceptions. While we kept the reliability of the 616 
peripheral cue at chance level (i.e., 25%), we made the central number cue 617 
predictive of the target location at 50%. Due to our unbalanced trial matrix following 618 
the combination of spatial cueing procedures, this modification allowed us to 619 
increase the overall number of unattended and stimulus-driven trials. Our 620 
instructions to participants emphasized the need to use the central number cue 621 
regardless of its reliability. (Analyses confirm their compliance with our directives.) 622 
Identical to the second experiment, we asked participants to discriminate the 623 
orientation of targets and then provide confidence judgments. Mask latency was 624 
fixed to 55ms. Moreover, we used the QUEST staircase procedure to titrate task 625 
performance at ~75% accuracy by varying the target’s Michelson contrast values. 626 
The initial contrast value was set to .10. Each testing session comprised two parts: 627 
a first one aiming to find the accurate contrast thresholds for type 1 performances 628 
across all attention conditions, and a second one where we assumed that these 629 
performances were stable enough for applying our analyses. Thus, we relied on 630 
the first 480 trials of the titration procedure to determine the contrast thresholds for 631 
each participant. This process involved 180 unattended trials, 60 stimulus-driven 632 
trials, 180 goal-driven trials, and 60 combined attention trials. During this phase, 633 
participants were solely required to indicate the orientation of the target. In the 634 
second phase, participants were asked to also input their confidence judgments at 635 
the end of each trial. In total, for the second phase, participants completed 936 636 
unattended trials, 312 stimulus-driven trials, 936 goal-driven trials, and 312 637 
combined trials.  While we assumed that the titration procedure reached a stable 638 
threshold in the first phase, we nonetheless applied the QUEST algorithm 639 
throughout the second half of the experiment to safeguard against factors that may 640 





Objective performance (type 1 response) in experiment 3. We evaluated the 644 
reliability of our titration procedure across attention conditions by estimating 645 
perceptual sensitivity d’ for each participant in each attention condition 646 
(Supplementary Figure 6). Again, we used hierarchical linear regression models. 647 
While the titration procedure properly controlled performance for stimulus-driven 648 
orienting, we observed a small benefit for goal-driven orienting over perceptual 649 
sensitivity (Supplementary Figure 6; Tables 7 and 8 in supplementary material; β 650 
= 0.39, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.24, 0.53]). Conversely, we observed no effect of 651 
attention on the decision criterion (Supplementary Figure 6 and Table 9 in 652 
supplementary material). The QUEST algorithm was therefore unable to perfectly 653 
match performances across all attention conditions. This outcome likely follows 654 
from the demanding experimental context comprising the combination of a double 655 
cueing strategy with visual masking during a target discrimination task. 656 
Nevertheless, the titration procedure eliminated the influence of stimulus-driven 657 
orienting on perceptual sensitivity, and strongly curtailed the effects of goal-driven 658 
orienting paving the way for the application of type 2 SDT to subjective judgments. 659 
 660 
Subjective judgments (type 2 response) for experiment 3. The current results 661 
replicate those of experiment 1 and 2. Experimentally controlling for task 662 
performance across attention yielded the same pattern. Again, visual assessment 663 
of MCMC chains and the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (i.e., R-Hat < 1.1) confirmed 664 
convergence of the models across all parameter estimates (see supplementary 665 
Figure 7). Likewise, the DIC only varied marginally across models (Figure 4), 666 
thereby conveying that more complex models hardly improved the fit compared to 667 
the baseline model. These results replicate our previous findings and verify the 668 
lack of influence of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting over the M-Ratio. In 669 
particular, the 95% HDI of the posterior densities for the betas of the full models 670 
revealed that participants displayed a marginal gain in type 2 efficiency beyond 671 
task performance during the unattended condition (μ of β0 = 1.19, 95% HDI [1.07 672 
1.32]), while the model indicates that stimulus-driven and goal-driven again failed 673 
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to heighten the M-Ratio (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity] = -.047, 95% HDI [-674 
.226 .136]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .061, 95% HDI [-.112 .237]). 675 
Likewise, their interaction was also obviously statistically unreliable (μ of 676 
β3[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .018, 95% HDI [-677 
.244 .283]). The third experiment therefore replicates our previous results and 678 
verifies the limited influence of visuospatial attention on confidence reports. Visual 679 
inspection of the projected M-Ratio values (Figure 4) confirm this assessment, 680 
where we see the absence of attention modulation.       681 
 
Figure 4. Type 2 signal detection analysis for subjective judgments in Experiment 3 A. Averaged values 
for estimated individual values for type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) from MCMC modelling across 
stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and 55ms mask latencies. Error bars represent bootstrapped 
95% C.I. B. Deviance information criterion that corresponds to the four linear regression models that were 
fitted to the data to estimate M-Ratio from Experiments 3 as a function of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting. 
C. Posterior densities for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2 
responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio). The dotted lines represent 95% HDI. 
 
The same pattern emerged for type 2 criteria, where we similarly observed no 682 
influence of attention (see supplementary Figure 8).  Note that recent report 683 
indicates how relative blindsight may lead to inflated type 2 efficiency – a caveat 684 
that hinders this experimental approach (Rahnev & Fleming, 2019). However, we 685 
did not observe any such pattern here across attention conditions. 686 
 687 
Thus far, our results support the modular view of visuospatial attention at 688 
the level of perceptual sensitivity, yet also highlight the limited influence of 689 
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stimulus- and goal-driven orienting at subjective level of perception. Through all 690 
attention conditions, type 2 sensitivity equated type 1 sensitivity – a pattern 691 
suggesting that the loci of these attention systems are restricted to early 692 
processing of perceptual evidence, which in turn determines the emergence of 693 
perceptual information at the subjective level. Both stimulus- and goal-driven 694 
orienting therefore influence conscious perception and metacognition in a parallel 695 
and indirect fashion. In contrast, however, the current body of findings provides 696 
little information concerning the decision bound. This lacuna contrasts with 697 
previous work that emphasizes the impact of spatial attention over this component 698 
(Hawkins et al., 1990; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Rahnev et al., 2011). We accordingly 699 
examined the modularity of attention within the context of target detection 700 
paradigm to evaluate the joint and isolated influence of stimulus- and goal-driven 701 
orienting over the decision bound. This parameter of the SDT model informs 702 
current views on the threshold of target awareness (Jachs et al., 2015). In 703 
particular, the decision bound reflects an internal bias relative to the amount of 704 
evidence required for committing to the occurrence of the signal. This parameter 705 
therefore denotes whether individuals adopt more liberal or conservative stances 706 
with respect to the decision process and the perceptual evidence available. While 707 
a liberal tendency shows a propensity for committing to the presence of the signal 708 
with limited evidence, a conservative tendency instead reflects a propensity to 709 
require more evidence before making such commitments. Hence, in addition to 710 
perceptual sensitivity, visuospatial orienting may also induce heightened 711 
tendencies to report awareness of target, which would account for previous reports 712 
of elevated conscious perception as a function of attention (e.g., Hsu et al., 2011).       713 
 714 
Experiment 4 715 
Method 716 
Participants. We recruited 44 participants for the fourth experiment. They received 717 
a monetary compensation of $10/hour for one two-hour session of 1728 trials (i.e., 718 
648 unattended trials, 216 stimulus-driven cueing trials, 648 goal-driven cueing 719 
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trials, 216 combined cueing trials). Participants completed a series of 10 practice 720 
trials until they understood the task. 721 
 722 
Again, we relied on previous research (Chica et al., 2014) and G*Power3 to assess 723 
the sample size following estimates for repeated measures F-tests on cueing 724 
effects for response times in the context of target detection tasks. For a central 725 
predictive cue at long cue-target latencies (i.e., > 500ms), we required a sample of 726 
9 participants to achieve a power of .8 based on a large effect size (η2 = .23) and 727 
an alpha value of .05. For a peripheral non-predictive cue at short cue-target 728 
latencies (i.e., < 300ms), we needed 5 participants to attain a power of .8 based 729 
on the rather large effect size (η2 = .44) at an alpha level of .05.      730 
 731 
Six participants were excluded due to poor accuracy (< 50%) and high number of 732 
trials without a response (> 15%). 38 participants (26 adult females; age: M = 21.61 733 
y.o, SD = 3.46) were kept.  734 
 735 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were similar to the previous 736 
experiments, except for the following differences (Figure 1). The purpose of this 737 
fourth installment was to evaluate the effect of stimulus-driven and goal-driven 738 
attention on target detection. We relied on the QUEST algorithm to avoid ceiling 739 
and floor effects. Again, this algorithm titrates the Michelson contrast value of the 740 
Gabor target as a function of detection performance in the unattended condition 741 
so that participants would perform at approximately 70% accuracy in that 742 
experimental condition. The calibration procedure allowed stimulus- and goal-743 
driven orienting to facilitate perception while avoiding ceiling effects.  744 
 745 
Design & Procedure. The design and procedure were similar to previous 746 
experiments, as we kept validity of the peripheral cue at chance level (i.e., 25%) 747 
and the central number cue at 50%. Again, our instructions to participants 748 
emphasized the need to use the central number cue, and forthcoming analyses 749 
confirm their compliance with our directives. Critically, we employed a target 750 
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detection task instead of a target discrimination task. The target was present for 751 
half of the trials and participants were informed of this contingency. We asked them 752 
to indicate whether a target event had occurred at a probed location. We kept the 753 
masking latency to 55ms and used the QUEST staircase procedure throughout the 754 
experiment to titrate task performance in the unattended condition at ~70% 755 
detection accuracy by varying the target’s Michelson contrast values. We used this 756 
titration procedure to avoid floor and ceiling effects following attention orienting. 757 
The initial value was set to .10, while the mean contrast value during the task was 758 
.38 (SD = .26). For data analysis, we removed the first block of trials (i.e., 144 759 
trials) for each participant to allow the QUEST algorithm to stabilize properly and 760 
reach dependable contrast values. Combining spatial cueing with a target 761 
detection task is challenging due to the difficulty of categorizing target absent trial 762 
relative to attention conditions – i.e., in the absence of a target event one cannot 763 
determine cue validity. We overcame this issue by matching the contingencies of 764 
the cues to the probing of a particular location following the mask onset on each 765 
trial. In this way, the location of the probe determined cue validity. Hence, we would 766 
probe the location of the stimulus-driven attention cue 25% of the time (i.e., 767 
chance-level non-predictive cueing), and the location of the goal-driven cue 50% 768 
of the time (i.e., predictive cueing). Also, note that the target event, which was 769 
present for only half of the trials, and could only occur at the probed location. 770 
Participants were aware of these specificities. Given that the probe conveyed no 771 
information about the likelihood of a target event across our experimental 772 
conditions, the effects of attention were orthogonal to the probing procedure.  One 773 
of the four masks would turn red (i.e., RGB values of 255, 0, 0; 37.7 cd/m2) after 774 
198ms and served as the probe. Participants were then required to indicate 775 
whether the target stimulus was present or absent as quickly and accurately as 776 
possible following its onset. 777 
 778 
Detection Response - Signal Detection Theory. We used signal detection theory 779 
to assess detection performance. We calculated perceptual sensitivity d’ and 780 
decision criterion C. We applied the following correction ((2*N)-1)/(2*N), where N 781 
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equals the number of trials, whenever hit rate was equal to 1; and 1/(2*N) 782 




Objective performance (type 1 detection response) in experiment 4. Unexpectedly 787 
with respect to our hypotheses, the current analysis reveals that only goal-driven 788 
attention benefited perceptual sensitivity (Figure 5). This outcome contrasts with 789 
previous literature in that stimulus-driven orienting did not boost perceptual 790 
evidence. Hierarchical linear regression models validated this observation (see 791 
Tables 10 and 11 in supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .02), wherein goal-792 
driven cue validity was the sole predictor (β = 0.29, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.15, 0.44]). 793 
Bayes factor analysis confirmed this pattern by providing positive evidence for the 794 
null hypothesis regarding stimulus-driven orienting, BF01 = 12. This unexpected 795 
result suggests that the influence of stimulus-driven over perceptual evidence 796 
might be limited in the context of signal detection whenever goal-driven is also 797 
engaged. Conversely, however, we found that both systems influenced the 798 
decision criterion, and both contributed to a reduction in conservative tendencies 799 
(Figure 5). The best fitting model (see Tables 12 and 13 in supplementary material; 800 
Marginal R2GLMM = .25) confirmed this by showing that both stimulus-driven (β = -801 
0.77, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.94, -0.6]) and goal-driven cue validity (β = -0.29, SE = 802 
0.09, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.12]) were reliable predictors. Hence, both forms of orienting 803 
lessened response biases. Critically, our analyses were again consistent with the 804 
modular view of visuospatial attention. While both stimulus- and goal-driven 805 
orienting altered the criterion, our analysis shows limited interaction between them. 806 
Here, the full model comprising the interaction parameter did not improve the fit (χ2 807 
(1) = .004, p = .95; Figure 5). Bayes factor analysis provided further support for 808 
this view by favoring the null hypothesis relative to the interaction model, BF01 = 809 
12.3. In sum, both stimulus- and goal-driven attention alter response biases in a 810 
parallel manner. Here, we observed that participants adopt a conservative stance 811 
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relative to the detection of target events at unattended locations, while both forms 812 
of orienting reduced this particular bias independently of each other.  813 
    814 
Response times for detection response. We examined response times (RTs) from 815 
the onset of the probe to confirm the reliability of the cueing procedure over 816 
performance in the context of target detection. This analysis aimed to ensure that 817 
each cue produced facilitation. Here, different patterns of RTs emerged across 818 
attention conditions as a function of the target’s contingency (i.e., present or 819 
absent). We accordingly evaluated the effects of attention separately for target 820 
present and target absent trials (see Figure 5). We used median reaction times of 821 
accurate trials (i.e., hits and correct rejections only) and once again applied 822 
hierarchical linear regression model in a stepwise fashion by including stimulus-823 
driven attention cue validity, goal-driven attention cue validity, and their interaction 824 
as fixed factors, and participants as a random factor. For correct rejections, we 825 
observed a small effect of stimulus-driven attention (see Tables 14 and 15 in 826 
supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .004), wherein the main effect of 827 
stimulus-driven cue validity produced faster response times (β = -17.62, SE = 6.98, 828 
95% CI [-31.35, -3.9]). However, this effect is not statistically significant when we 829 
fit the full model (Figure 5), which suggests that the influence of stimulus-driven 830 
attention remains somewhat marginal in the context of target absent trials. A 831 
different pattern emerged for hits (i.e., target present). Here, the best fitting model 832 
(see Table 15 and 16 in supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .09) revealed 833 
facilitations for response times across both stimulus-driven (β = -48.39, SE = 834 
10.04, 95% CI [-68.06, -28.72]) and goal-driven attention (β = -49.77, SE = 10.04, 835 
95% CI [-69.44, -30.09]), which corroborates the validity of the double cueing 836 
procedure in the context of target detection. Participants were therefore faster to 837 
respond as a function of cue validity in both attention conditions. Importantly, the 838 
full model did not improve the fit (χ2(1) < .3), thus providing further evidence for 839 
parallel processing between stimulus-driven and goal-driven attention in this 840 
particular experimental context (Figure 5). Bayes factor analysis supported this 841 
construal, as evidence backed the null hypothesis (i.e., best fitting model) with 842 
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respect to the interaction model (i.e., best fitting model and the interaction), BF01 = 843 
11.02. These results therefore highlight how some of the effects of attention are 844 
contingent to the presence of the target signal. Furthermore, evidence is consistent 845 
with our previous findings and shows an additive pattern. 846 
 
Figure 5. Response time and signal detection analyses in Experiment 4. A. Signal detection perceptual 
sensitivity (d’), as well as decision criterion (C) as a function of stimulus- and goal-driven attention. B. median 
reaction times for target absent and target present trials as a function stimulus-driven and goal-driven 
attention. C. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models to predict perceptual sensitivity (d’) and the 
criterion (C) to evaluate the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention. Here, we plot fixed effects β 
parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI. D. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models 
to predict median response times for target present and target absent to evaluate the effects of stimulus- and 
goal-driven attention. Here, we plot fixed effects β parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
The unexpected outcome regarding the impotence of stimulus-driven 847 
orienting over perceptual sensitivity led us to replicate our findings in a fifth and 848 
final experiment. We detail how we replicated the current results in supplementary 849 
material. Specifically, this last installment corroborated the absence of an effect for 850 
stimulus-driven attention over perceptual sensitivity, as well the modularity of 851 





Attention is multifaceted, which means that the selection of information 855 
comprises multiple components operating alongside each other, including different 856 
forms of orienting. Based on this account, the present study examined how the 857 
modularity of visuospatial attention modulate several aspects of perception, 858 
including signal detection and discrimination, visual awareness, and 859 
metacognition. To this end, we tested the isolated and joint influence of stimulus- 860 
and goal-driven attention across type 1 and type 2 SDT using a double cueing 861 
approach through multiple installments. Our findings are manifold. Previous work 862 
argues that the signal detection theoretic framework corresponds a hierarchical 863 
architecture, wherein type 1 SDT reflects to lower-level processes and type 2 SDT 864 
higher-order ones (Fleming & Daw, 2017; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016). Assuming the 865 
validity of this framework, our findings demonstrate how functional modules of 866 
visuospatial attention solely influence lower-level processes, while failing to directly 867 
impact higher-order processes. Moreover, both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting 868 
boosted perceptual evidence during target discrimination with minimal interaction, 869 
thus upholding the modular view at this level of processing. In turn, neither 870 
influenced subjective judgments of perception once task performance was factored 871 
out, per type 2 SDT analyses and the relative blindsight approach. The current 872 
body of results accordingly challenges the notion that visuospatial attention directly 873 
interfaces with conscious perception, and instead aligns with previous work that 874 
downplays the role of selection in the emergence of consciousness (Brascamp et 875 
al., 2010; van Boxtel, 2017; van Boxtel et al., 2010b; Watanabe et al., 2011; 876 
Wilimzig et al., 2008; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008). In lieu of a 877 
tight relationship, our research implies that visuospatial attention indirectly relates 878 
to subjective dimensions of perception through its influence on perceptual 879 
sensitivity. In this way, both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting boost visual 880 
awareness and metacognition by increasing the amount of evidence available at 881 
the perceptual level. We replicated this pattern across several experiments. 882 
Likewise, our results support the modular view at the level of the decision bound, 883 
where both forms of orienting lessened conservative tendencies independently of 884 
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each other. Because response biases impact subjective reports of conscious 885 
perception (Peters et al., 2016), this outcome implies that both stimulus- and goal-886 
driven attention likely influence subjective judgments of perception through this 887 
component as well, consistent with previous work (Rahnev et al., 2011). In sum, 888 
our findings submit a comprehensive account that limits the scope of visuospatial 889 
attention to boosting perceptual evidence and reducing response biases, while 890 
evidence corroborated the modular view.  891 
 892 
A large body of research emphasizes the centrality of signal enhancement 893 
and noise reduction for the efficient selection of information during perception 894 
(Carrasco et al., 2000; Dosher & Lu, 2000a, 2000b; Hawkins et al., 1990; Hillyard 895 
et al., 1998; Lu & Dosher, 1998; Lu et al., 2002; Luck, 1995; Luck et al., 1997; Luck 896 
et al., 2000). Hence, both mechanisms likely shape the influence of stimulus- and 897 
goal-driven on conscious perception via lower-level processing. Consistent with 898 
this hypothesis, previous work in electroencephalography relates early sensory 899 
gains to visual awareness (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010), while other reports relate 900 
confidence judgments to the amount evidence available during perceptual 901 
decisions, as opposed to the relative amount of signal to the noise (Koizumi et al., 902 
2015; Samaha et al., 2016; Zylberberg et al., 2012). These findings support the 903 
notion that visuospatial orienting contributes to changing conscious perception 904 
through signal enhancement (Carrasco et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009). Conversely, 905 
the influence of noise reduction mechanisms on subjective judgements of 906 
perception seems more limited (Vernet et al., 2019). Altogether, previous studies 907 
suggest that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting alter reports of awareness and 908 
confidence by boosting the amount of sensory evidence available at the perceptual 909 
level of processing. In the present work, this benefit transpired as increased 910 
discrimination sensitivity (i.e., type 1 sensitivity) in our different experiments, which 911 
then resulted in greater awareness and metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., type 2 912 
sensitivity). Furthermore, because both forms of orienting contribute to this sensory 913 
outcome in parallel, the modular view promotes the idea that the attentional route 914 




The SDT framework defines the criterion parameter as the amount of 917 
evidence that underlies perceptual decisions for reporting the presence of a 918 
particular signal (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Accordingly, this item estimates 919 
response biases, which ultimately relates to the subjective appraisal of individuals 920 
(Peters et al., 2016). In this way, two individuals may show the same degree of 921 
perceptual sensitivity, yet report different experiences following such biases. 922 
Several factors dictate how the perceptual system establishes this threshold, 923 
including spatial attention (Chica et al., 2011; Downing, 1988; Hawkins et al., 1990; 924 
Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Rahnev et al., 2011; Sridharan et 925 
al., 2017). Consistent with this previous work, the current study indicates that while 926 
individuals were inclined to adopt a conservative stance whenever we probed at 927 
unattended locations, stimulus- and goal-driven orienting mitigated this bias 928 
independently of each other. These findings further expand our framework by 929 
showing that, in addition to improving the signal-to-noise ratio in the context of 930 
discrimination, both forms of orienting impact how the perceptual system sets the 931 
decision bound. Previous work relates changes in criterion setting during 932 
perception to variations in neuronal excitability, as indexed by the power of alpha 933 
oscillations in the posterior region of the brain (Iemi & Busch, 2018; Iemi et al., 934 
2017; Kloosterman et al., 2019). Given that spatial attention induces relative 935 
changes in alpha waves across sensory regions (Foxe & Snyder, 2011), attending 936 
to a particular hemifield likely influences the criterion by increasing overall neuronal 937 
excitability in the contralateral sensory cortex.  938 
 939 
Our results contrast with the findings from a previous study showing that 940 
attention induces conservative shifts of the criterion, as opposed to the liberal one 941 
we observe in the present work (Rahnev et al., 2011). According to the authors of 942 
this previous report, their results are consistent with the idea that individuals adopt 943 
a unified decision bound across attention conditions (Gorea & Sagi, 2001), while 944 
attention decreases trial-by-trial variance of the perceptual signal. This pattern 945 
ultimately leads to a reduction of false alarm rates, thereby producing a 946 
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conservative pattern in the perceptual decision process. Importantly, this 947 
interpretation entails that the criterion is not dynamically adjusted as a function of 948 
attention processing. However, note that this previous research occurred in the 949 
context of the relative blindsight methodology where noise levels were greater for 950 
attended stimuli than for unattended ones so as to allow task performance to be 951 
equated across both conditions. One can therefore argue that the conservative 952 
stance reported in this work follows from elevated noise levels for attended events 953 
(Vernet et al., 2019), although additional experiments in this particular report 954 
dispute this interpretation. And yet, recent findings similarly challenge the idea that 955 
individuals adopt a fixed decision criterion across different contexts of attention 956 
(Denison et al., 2017). This work instead demonstrates that considerations 957 
pertaining to the attentional state of individuals influence how they calibrate the 958 
decision bound, which essentially means that the criterion is adjusted in a 959 
dynamical fashion. In light of this interpretation, evidence from the present study 960 
further demonstrates that these dynamical adjustments occur separately following 961 
stimulus- and goal-driven orienting. This outcome therefore supports the modular 962 
view. 963 
 964 
In contrast to the first and second experiments where stimulus-driven 965 
attention improved perceptual sensitivity during target discrimination, we observed 966 
no such facilitation following stimulus-driven orienting in the context of target 967 
detection. While this outcome might seem unexpected, previous studies report 968 
similar findings at low target contrast values (Prinzmetal et al., 2008). In fact, our 969 
results align with previous assessments showing that non-predictive peripheral 970 
cues hardly improve perceptual sensitivity for signal detection despite reliable 971 
cueing effects over response times and the decision criterion (Chica et al., 2011). 972 
Perceptual benefits in the context of spatial cueing seem to emerge only when 973 
cues are made informative (i.e., predictive) about the target’s possible location, 974 
thereby engaging goal-driven control of attention. A possible explanation for the 975 
limitations of stimulus-driven attention over target detection is the emergence of 976 
inhibition of return (IOR). The engagement and subsequent disengagement of 977 
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stimulus-driven attention to a peripheral location typically causes a decrease in 978 
performance for target events occurring at this previously attended site, the IOR 979 
phenomenon (Klein, 2000). The presence of IOR seems like a reasonable 980 
explanation for the absence of perceptual benefits here. In fact, previous work 981 
indicates that successive events at the same peripheral location can enhance the 982 
potency of this phenomenon (Dukewich & Boehnke, 2008). Given that our 983 
experimental approach involves such consecutive events (i.e., peripheral cue, 984 
target stimulus on half of the trials, mask stimulus, and finally the probe stimulus), 985 
it increases the likelihood of IOR. However, note that our findings show a cueing 986 
effect over response times for stimulus-driven orienting following the presence of 987 
target events, which weakens this interpretation. Ultimately, this particular outcome 988 
provides additional support to the idea that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting 989 
operate differently: While the latter produced perceptual benefits for both signal 990 
discrimination and detection, the former was only reliable over discrimination 991 
sensitivity. The absence of benefits following stimulus-driven attention for target 992 
detection therefore demonstrates that both forms of orienting are not bounded by 993 
the same parameters. This perspective aligns with previous work that emphasizes 994 
distinct selection mechanisms for stimulus- and goal-driven attention (Dosher & 995 
Lu, 2000a, 2000b; He et al., 1996; Lu & Dosher, 1998).  996 
 997 
One might argue that our results can be explained through a unitary process 998 
of attention, such that the absence of an interaction would in fact reflect the 999 
outcome of a single process engaged by both cues. However, several points 1000 
undermine this competing account. First, the list of qualitative differences that 1001 
characterize the dichotomous view of spatial attention dispute the idea that single 1002 
all-encompassing orienting system underlies both forms of orienting (Chica et al., 1003 
2013). Furthermore, our experimental design and cueing strategies rest on a 1004 
dense literature that emphasizes how different patterns arise from stimulus- and 1005 
goal-driven cueing (Chica et al., 2014). A unique system account therefore runs 1006 
counter to a broad body of research. In particular, the idea that goal-driven 1007 
attention might be engaged by both cues seems implausible because it would 1008 
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entail that the deployment of this alleged unitary goal-driven process occurs at 1009 
multiple locations while incurring minimal cost.  Furthermore, the short cue-target 1010 
latency for peripheral onset (i.e., from 99ms to 297ms) would hardly leave enough 1011 
time for the concurrent re-deployment of goal-driven attention on trials where both 1012 
cues indicate separate locations. Evidence for this possibility remains contentious 1013 
(Jans et al., 2010; however, see Eimer & Grubert, 2014). The current findings 1014 
therefore seem nearly impossible to reconcile with a unitary process account.  1015 
 1016 
One smaller challenge to the interpretation of the current results concerns 1017 
our usage of number cues, whereby previous reports show that this form of cueing 1018 
includes some form of automatic and overlearned orienting responses due to 1019 
associations between numeral knowledge and the spatial organization of clocks 1020 
(Ristic et al., 2006). Our cueing methodology could therefore have introduced 1021 
some form of combined cueing responses that would comprise both goal-driven 1022 
and automatic orienting, as opposed to a pure form of goal-driven orienting (Ristic 1023 
& Kingstone, 2006; Ristic & Landry, 2015). Note, however, that research on 1024 
number cues also uncovered similar effects for the number line where lower values 1025 
(e.g., the number “3”) facilitate left orienting and higher ones (e.g., the number “9”) 1026 
right orienting. Certain numbers (e.g., the number “3”) could therefore ignite 1027 
opposing automatic responses depending on whether the overlearned component 1028 
here reflects numerical knowledge relative to clocks (i.e., automatic orienting to the 1029 
right) or the number line (i.e., automatic orienting to the left. Task set and higher-1030 
order processes likely mediate between these conflicting processes (Egner & 1031 
Hirsch, 2005). Nevertheless, our results are consistent with previous findings in 1032 
showing that this potential combined effect of goal-driven orienting and 1033 
automaticity remains largely independent of stimulus-driven orienting responses 1034 
(Ristic & Kingstone, 2012; Ristic et al., 2012). Another possible limitation concerns 1035 
the usage of a binary scale for subjective reports when, perhaps, a four options 1036 
scale would provide a better resolution to uncover the effect of attention on 1037 
subjective judgments of perception (Sandberg et al., 2010). Here, we relied on a 1038 
binary scale to ease task difficulty for participants and allow them to perform it at a 1039 
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higher tempo. Each session was already tedious, therefore going from a two 1040 
options objective response to a four options subjective scale would have slowed 1041 
them down significantly.    1042 
 1043 
Lastly, the fact that our explanation rests on null hypotheses regarding the 1044 
interaction of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting for type 1 responses and the 1045 
absence of an attention effect for type 2 responses raises the prospect of a type II 1046 
error (Dienes, 2014; Gallistel, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). However, our 1047 
experimental approach mitigates these concerns through different means. First, 1048 
we confirmed the validity of the cueing procedure for engaging both forms of 1049 
orienting. In fact, we report facilitation for both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting 1050 
for at least one estimate in all of our experiments. Thus, null findings do not follow 1051 
from the absence of an effect of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting on perception. 1052 
Second, we replicated each finding across different installments of our 1053 
methodology. Third, we relied on Bayesian statistics to support null hypotheses 1054 
(Dienes, 2014). Considered together, these different steps make it unlikely that our 1055 
interpretation is invalid due to type II error.     1056 
 1057 
Conclusion 1058 
The current study investigated the multifaceted view of attention through 1059 
type 1 and type 2 SDT. Relying on the double cueing approach to concurrently 1060 
engage stimulus- and goal-driven orienting, our findings support the modularity of 1061 
visuospatial attention. In particular, our study shows that both systems modulate 1062 
perceptual evidence and the decision criterion independently from one another. 1063 
Conversely, we found little evidence that attention directly interfaces with the 1064 
subjective dimensions of perception. Accordingly, the dynamics between 1065 
visuospatial attention and human consciousness appear to rest on indirect 1066 
connections, which complicates the story. Our research therefore provides a 1067 
comprehensive account that opens new research avenues for exploring the 1068 
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